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In the wake of the horrific Paris terror
attacks in November President Obama declared, “ISIS is the face of evil [and] our
goal is to... destroy this barbaric organization.” (White House, 2015) Global leaders
and organizations have echoed this call to
arms. Yet it has been more than a year
since the fall of Mosul and ISIS is not significantly weakened. In his statement to the
G20 President Obama outlined the United
States’ military, diplomatic, and counterterror strategy for containing ISIS. This approach is failing because it does not adequately challenge ISIS’s propaganda machine. Although the President acknowledged ISIS is “very savvy when it comes
to social media, and able to infiltrate the
minds of. . . disa↵ected individuals around
the world” there has been no comprehensive counter-messaging response from the
West.
Despite ISIS’s brutality, they have recruited thousands of people from advanced
democracies. Recent intelligence reports
estimate that over 4,500 citizens have defected from Europe and the United States
to join ISIS since 2011.(Schmitt & Sengupta, 2015) Many of these people know
little about Islam, are disillusioned with society, and are searching for a sense of meaning. The Islamic State’s recruiting techniques are unlike those of any other terrorist organization since they have adapted
their propaganda to the digital age. ISIS
uses centralized propaganda to prey on
a target’s weak sense of identity and social networks to disseminate their message. Twitter accounts sympathetic to ISIS
use themes of purpose and camaraderie
among jihadists to attract isolated Western
youths. Visually and emotionally appealing videos and magazines depict a utopian
society where all Sunnis are prospering.
The astonishing success of these methods
requires governments to adapt to the cur-

rent digital environment, rather than recycle counter-messaging tactics of the past.
There are several challenges to developing an e↵ective policy response to ISIS
propaganda. First and foremost is the
ungoverned and loosely regulated nature
of social media. Although it is possible to shut down individual Twitter accounts affiliated with terrorist organizations, they often reappear within hours
under a slightly di↵erent account name.
While the hacker collective Anonymous
boasts of suspending 20,000 ISIS-related
Twitter profiles, (RT International, 2015)
these users will simply create new accounts.
Second, the media airing “news-worthy”
propaganda assists ISIS. The gruesome execution video of American journalist James
Foley circulated with the help of CNN and
the BBC, rather than ISIS agents. Finally, governmental agencies have lost the
fight over messaging with ISIS. Although
many groups are dedicated to counter propaganda, ISIS has thousands of social networking accounts and media specialists
who have crafted a more e↵ective recruiting campaign.
Counterterror organizations can work
with motivated private stakeholders and
third parties to blunt the e↵ectiveness of
ISIS propaganda and stem the tide of recruits from Western countries. These initiatives should focus on three major objectives:
Restricting communication channels.
ISIS has a dominant position on social networks that allows them to easily communicate with potential recruits. Any social media counter-o↵ensive will not succeed without community policing of social networks.
Citizens should be encouraged to report
ISIS related accounts and tech companies
should be pressured to more aggressively
suspend these users. This initiative should
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aim to create a grassroots movement that
can keep up with the thousands of ISIS
sympathizers online. This will allow government agencies to focus on more complex
outlets, such as shutting down apps and accounts made by ISIS.
Delegitimizing the central messages of
the propaganda. ISIS media presents a
utopian society where recruits can find
meaning. Counter-messaging should focus
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on describing the reality of the situation,
with an emphasis on the stories of defectors and refugees fleeing the Islamic State.
Supporting at-risk youths who are likely
to be targets. Many Western recruits follow
similar patterns of isolation from society.
Improving outreach on a personalized basis can o↵er these people an alternative to
jihad.

Understanding ISIS Propaganda
ISIS’s propaganda machine di↵ers from
previous terrorist organizations in its sophistication, content, and distribution
mechanisms. ISIS has two divisions dedicated to propaganda, Al-Hayat Media and
Mu’assassat al-Furqan. The former focuses
on recruiting and presenting an idyllic society, while the latter focuses on spreading fear. (Saltman & Winter, 2014, 38)
These organizations have a prominent role
within ISIS. According to one defector,
“The media people are more important
than the soldiers and their monthly income
is higher.” (Miller & Mekhennet, 2015)
This bureaucracy includes many former
tech and news employees who are adept at
video editing and graphic design. While
the top media boss is a 36-year-old Syrian
named Abu Amr al-Shami, there are several Westerners near the top of the hierarchy. (Talbot, 2015) Multiple reports reference an American in charge of editing

several key videos. (Miller & Mekhennet,
2015) Until his death former German rapper Deso Dogg played a key role within AlHayat Media. (Talbot, 2015)
This wealth of foreign talent means
that ISIS has more media capability than
Al-Qaeda and its affiliates ever had, and
this is reflected in the high production
value of ISIS propaganda.
In sharp
contrast to the grainy videos of Osama
Bin-Laden, ISIS disseminates Hollywood
style, hour-long movies about life in the
Caliphate and the victories of the Islamic State. John Cantile, a British news
hostage that was taken prisoner, hosted
many expose-style programs about life in
the Caliphate. The ISIS magazine, Dabiq,
is visually impressive and is filled with articles written by Westerners. ISIS has even
developed several original nasheeds, or jihadi songs, that play in the background of
videos. (Schatz, 2015)

Appealing to Potential Recruits
ISIS propaganda in the West targets 1625 year olds who are isolated from their
societies and who do not have a strong
sense of identity or purpose. (Callimachi,
2015) (Yan, 2014) They often know little about Islam or have learned about
religion from ISIS operatives. A recent
study identifies four themes ISIS uses to
attract recruits: Urgency, Agency, Authenticity, and Victory. All Sunni Muslims are
called to come fight immediately to prevent

the slaughter of their religious brothers at
the hands of the infidels. They are told
that they will have an impact, that they
are fighting for the only legitimate Muslim State, and that their actions will lead
to victory. (Fernandez, 2015) Viewers feel
that they are needed and have an obligation to fight for ISIS. Potential recruits are
shown a sense of purpose and identity that
they did not have before. If they come
to the Caliphate then their life will have
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meaning. Recruits may discount the barbarity of ISIS as a necessary evil to create a utopian society. Many defectors explain their rationale for joining ISIS along
these lines. One thought he was going “to
help in a humanitarian sense the people of
Syria” and another wanted to live under
strict Islamic law and accepted the stoning
of adulterers. (De Freytas-Tamura, 2015)
They only prepared to leave once they realized ISIS was very di↵erent than the propaganda.
This image of purpose is supplemented
by the theme of camaraderie among the
soldiers of the Islamic State. ISIS goes to
great lengths to illustrate the multi-ethnic
background of its members. The first issue
of Dabiq contains pictures of jihadists from
many backgrounds embracing each other
and huddling together like sports players
before a game. (The Clarion Project, 2014)
Several videos showcase Western recruits
discussing the great friends they have made
in the Caliphate and the acceptance of foreigners in their society. With these messages ISIS emotionally appeals to its target
demographic by o↵ering an accepting and
inclusive community. ISIS operatives will
often chat online or Skype with potential
recruits for hours, o↵ering them the hope
of friendship they do not have at home.
Rather than emphasizing religious altruism, which Western recruits may not
engage with, ISIS propaganda focuses on
utopian living and the exploitation of
women. Instead of preaching abstinence
from sex before marriage and alcohol, ISIS
gives viewers an image of the good life. One
movie, entitled Five Star Jihad, “depicted
life for Islamic State fighters as lavish,
with access to hillside mansions, gleaming SUVs and swimming pools overlooking the group’s conquered terrain.” (Miller
& Mekhennet, 2015) ISIS media discusses
religion, but there is a much larger focus on adventure, community, and personal
power, once again appealing to the lonely
Westerner. There is also a clear emphasis on the foot soldier and the purposeful

life they can live in the Caliphate rather
than the leaders. ISIS gives “the world
access, willingly, to the daily lives of jihadists” and humanizes them in the process. (Saltman & Winter, 2014, 43) Most
importantly, the propaganda is shown as
inclusive to Sunni Muslims of all nationalities. Foreigners have no barrier to entry and can rise up the ranks as quickly as
Arabs.
To reinforce these themes, ISIS portrays women in two di↵erent ways based
on the intended audience of the messaging.
For propaganda aimed at women, they are
described as “jihadi brides,” participating
in the al-Khansaa police brigade and carrying AK-47s. (Ali, 2015) Unlike the Taliban,
which hid women from all propaganda and
confined them to the home, ISIS media
“emphasize[s] themes of sisterhood and belonging—and highlight[s] the role of marriage and family.” (Talbot, 2015) Women in
ISIS, such as UK defector Asqa Mahmoud,
reach out to others on social media encouraging them to travel to the Caliphate in
order to fulfill their duty, contribute meaningfully to the Caliphate, and to actively
participate in jihad.
The propaganda aimed at males gives a
much more accurate image of how women
are treated and exploited in ISIS territory. Magazine articles promote the idea
of sexual jihad, which argues that men
are allowed to relieve sexual tensions so
they can fight more e↵ectively. Although
sex before marriage is impermissible under normal circumstances, a highly controversial Fatwa attributed to Wahhabi cleric
Sheikh Mohamad al-Arefe in 20131 authorized this behavior during times of jihad. (Ali, 2015) ISIS has used this to legitimize sexual slavery and abuse in the territory it controls. One particularly graphic
Dabiq article boasts of selling captured
Yezidi women and girls as young as nine
into sex slavery. (Ali, 2015) Such material
appeals to lonely, sexually frustrated young
males who are ISIS’s target audience.

1 Some sources, including the report I use in this paper, link the concept to Sheikh Mohamad
al-Arefe during the unrest in Tunisia in 2013.‘ He has denied issuing the Fatwa.
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Digital Age Innovations
A Quilliam foundation report lists three
major areas of innovation: the global dissemination of threat, decentralized messaging, and the development of new software. (Saltman & Winter, 2014) Social
networks allow ISIS sympathizers to distribute propaganda more efficiently than
previous terror groups were able to. At
the peak of Al-Qaeda’s prominence, operatives could only air their videos through
the Al-Jazeera network or specific webforums. This meant that they could only
disseminate videos to a limited audience already looking for terrorist propaganda. Today, an ISIS member on Twitter can hijack a thread on unrelated trending topics. For example, during the 2014 World
Cup ISIS users tagged their tweets containing videos with #brazil 2014. (Saltman
& Winter, 2014, 40) This gave them access to a global network of casual Twitter users who were simply browsing for
sports updates. The a↵ordability of smartphones and proliferation of social networking means millions of people could see this
information. ISIS even dominates more
traditional media outlets. The sheer brutality of ISIS videos often makes them
“newsworthy” material for Western networks. When these news channels continuously play and analyze execution videos,
such as that of James Foley, it only increases the audience for ISIS’s propaganda.
Although most people will be repulsed by
these videos, a few will be receptive and
may be influenced to join ISIS.
Perhaps the most impressive aspect of
the ISIS propaganda machine is its use
of social media to rapidly spread its message. In 2014 ISIS created the Al-Battar
media battalion, which was “designed to
push ISIS propaganda,” “coordinate hash-

tag campaigns,” and “castigate ISIS opponents.” (Fernandez, 2015, 19) In addition,
there are many sympathetic “fan-boys”
outside ISIS territory that distribute videos
online and directly message potential recruits. Between these two groups there are
as many as 3,000 users that have the capability to produce as many as 90,000 tweets
a day. (Fernandez, 2015, 7) ISIS can flood
targets with messages and the sheer volume makes it hard for governments to keep
up. Since the “fan-boy” accounts originate
from outside the Caliphate, airstrikes have
a limited e↵ect on limiting media distribution. Reports from soldiers are instantaneously uploaded and sent across networks,
leading to “profound success in intimidating, recruiting, and fundraising.” (Saltman
& Winter, 2014, 41) Whereas previous terror groups needed rigid structures to distribute propaganda, ISIS has taken advantage of technological advances to create a
flexible and decentralized system that is
constantly being updated.
To further streamline operations ISIS
has developed new software, an unprecedented move for a terrorist organization.
The most prominent innovation, a Twitter app called “Dawn of Glad Tidings,” allows users to post tweets without manual
input. (Saltman & Winter, 2014, 41) The
Al-Battar battalion designs the tweets and
the app coordinates them based on a timing mechanism to avoid detection by algorithms. This app was available on the
Google Play store until it was removed,
and was “responsible [for] posting almost
40,000 tweets in a single day as IS marched
into Mosul.” (Saltman & Winter, 2014,
41) Even when ISIS sympathizers are away
from their devices, their accounts continue
to update at a prolific rate.

Existing Counter-Measures
Governments and independent organizations have implemented several programs

to counter ISIS propaganda but have had
very limited success. Many of these focus
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on delegitimizing ISIS and presenting an
alternative narrative.
In the United States, the Center for
Strategic Counterterrorism Communications (CSCC) has released several videos
aimed at discrediting ISIS. “Think Again
Turn Away,” a similar program run by the
state department, has been called an embarrassment by counterterror experts and
does not have source credibility. (Singal,
2015) In the UK, the “Prevent” program
aims to curb non-violent extremism. Under
this initiative, schools need to identify vulnerable2 children and since 2012 over 2,000
students have been sent to the government’s anti-radicalization program. (Ministry of Justice, 2012) (Khaleeli, 2015) Critics argue that this program is too inva-

sive, leads to racial profiling, and turns
teachers into spies. (Khaleeli, 2015) Ironically, Saudi Arabia claims to have one of
the more successful programs in the AlSakinah campaign, which is run by an independent NGO that is supported by the
government. This online service matches
Islamic scholars with users on jihadi websites vulnerable to radicalization. (Casptack, 2015) After this initial contact, participants are sent to a rehabilitation clinic,
and their families are financially compensated. This program boasts a remarkable 90% success rate3 with those that enter counseling. (Casptack, 2015) Yet Saudi
Arabia remains one of the largest terrorist recruiting grounds, and the government
continues to fund many extremist groups.

Policy Challenges
ISIS’s innovative propaganda presents multiple policy challenges that will require
Western counterterror agencies to adapt to
the digital age. The primary obstacle to
e↵ective policy is the ease of access to social media. If a Twitter account is suspended, an individual can just open a new
one. Filtering and blocking profiles manually is a time costly endeavor with almost no results. The Quilliam Foundation
tracked several ISIS related accounts and
found that many suspended accounts reappeared within days with a slightly di↵erent handle. (Saltman & Winter, 2014, 42)
Surprisingly, these accounts were quickly
able to re-gain their followers by instructing them to search for similar usernames4 .
One user was blocked twenty times and his
twenty-first account still has 20,000 subscribers. (Saltman & Winter, 2014, 42)
Anonymous, the hacker collective, recently
declared war on ISIS and reported 20,000

ISIS-related Twitter accounts. While this
makes for a good headline and adds some
extra work for ISIS sympathizers, it does
not seriously hamper their ability to disseminate propaganda via social media.
Counter-messaging programs have
struggled to match the quality of ISIS
content.
“Welcome to the ”Islamic
State” land”, the most viewed US antipropaganda video, seems like an amateur production made on iMovie and was
mocked by comedian John Oliver. These
agencies have little funding and sta↵ and
cannot compete with ISIS. The US CSCC
has a meager $5 million annual budget,
a sta↵ of fifteen, and access to 350 State
Department Twitter accounts. (Miller &
Hingam, 2015) ISIS has hundreds of people working in its media division and thousands of social media profiles. Up to this
point governments have lacked the required
talent to create high quality videos or to

2 The UK government website specifies 22 factors that may induce someone to join a terrorist
group. Many of these categories are vague, such as a desire for political or moral change, relevant
mental health issues, and a desire for status.
3 The program claims that 90% of participants are de-radicalized and rejoin society. This number may be so high because many potential recruits never entered counseling. These figures are
all reported by the center and are thus difficult to independently verify.
4 For example, an account would reappear with an extra letter or number in the handle.
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beat ISIS at its own game.
The final major policy challenge is
reaching potential recruits with these messages. Since many of these individuals are
disillusioned with their societies, it will be
difficult for government agencies to appeal
to them on an emotional level. Videos
with the State Department seal, such as the
widely-viewed “Welcome to the ”Islamic
State” land,” which sarcastically displays
brutal ISIS videos in an e↵ort to scare away
recruits, do not have credibility among people who distrust the government. (Miller &
Hingam, 2015) Even the e↵orts of Islamic
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clerics have had a minimal impact. While
almost all prominent Muslim religious leaders have publicly denounced ISIS, this has
failed to slow their recruiting e↵orts. (Fernandez, 2015, 14) These approaches may
have failed to connect because they are impersonal. ISIS operatives speaking directly
to recruits on social media for hours will
have more influence than distant figures of
authority. Once these people believe they
are friends with jihadists, they will likely
ignore blanket messages. More personalized rehabilitation that is tailored to the
profile of each at-risk individual is necessary.

Policy Recommendations
A multifaceted approach is required to respond to ISIS’s sophisticated propaganda
machine. Governments and counter-terror
organizations must destabilize ISIS’s system of messaging, delegitimize their propa-

ganda, and reach out to at-risk individuals.
These strategies must adapt to the nature
of social media and the global appeal of the
Islamic State. I recommend the following
policies:

Taking ISIS O✏ine
ISIS enjoys unprecedented dominance in
social media that has led to ease of distributing propaganda. A combination of
community policing, cooperation with tech
companies, and selective airstrikes will
hamper ISIS’s ability to attract recruits.
As discussed earlier, e↵orts to suspend
social media accounts linked with ISIS have
largely failed due to the public nature of
these platforms. This current response is
frustrating ISIS, but it has a minimal longterm impact once new accounts are created. However, the e↵ort to identify suspicious accounts has been limited to small,
dedicated groups of hackers (Cottee, 2015)
or resource-constrained government agencies. Encouraging a larger proportion of
the social media community to participate
in this e↵ort will lead to more success.
Facebook and Twitter already allow any
user to report a suspicious account, and
both sites prohibit threats of violence and
other abuses. (Altman, 2014) It does not
take a skilled hacker to recognize and re-

port an account that is distributing ISIS
materials. This will allow companies to focus on reviewing and suspending suspicious
profiles, rather than looking for them. Billions of people are active on social media. If
even a small percentage of them are watching for suspicious accounts, this will limit
ISIS’s ability to distribute propaganda.
To supplement this community policing, tech companies should be encouraged to utilize existing software to autonomously identify ISIS-related accounts.
One such program is PhotoDNA, a service currently used by Facebook, Twitter,
Google, and others to track down photos
of child pornography. PhotoDNA “tags”
o↵ending images with a unique ID that allows computers to remove similar photos
without the intervention of humans. (Burgett, 2014) This minimally invasive service only runs through metadata of images without searching through personal
inboxes. (Burgett, 2014) Tech companies
should expand the scope of PhotoDNA to
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identify accounts that share ISIS propaganda videos and images. Once a database
of this content is assembled it will be easy
to begin reporting users. Most importantly, this process will be able to keep up
with the fast pace of social media because
it does not require human identification of
accounts. This algorithm will be able to
track down new accounts once they post
a video with the same ID as ISIS propaganda.
Cyber-policing will be most e↵ective if
paired with surgical airstrikes on high-level
ISIS media operatives. Recent airstrikes
have killed German rapper Deso Dogg, a
high ranking operative in the Al-Hayat me-

dia division, (The Guardian, 2015) and Junaid Hussein, a leader in ISIS’s hacking division. (Post, 2015) Although ISIS will be
able to replace these people, killing high
value targets will severely delay, if not disrupt, the capacity of ISIS to develop propaganda. At some point ISIS will run out of
skilled developers. The threat of airstrikes
alone will force high-ranking officers into
hiding, further hindering this process. Any
air strikes should be highly selective and
seek to avoid civilian casualties. The urban setting of ISIS’s media headquarters
complicates this but does not make it impossible. Strikes should target convoys and
rural areas to minimize collateral damage.

Improving Counter-messaging
E↵orts by governments to provide an alternate message to ISIS propaganda have
not been successful because they do not
match the content, volume, and emotional
appeal of ISIS media. With their comparative lack of talent, counter-messaging agencies cannot hope to match the quality of
ISIS videos. Instead, they should emphasize the stories of defectors and the truth
about life in the Islamic State.
The most viewed counter-propaganda
videos are sarcastic, emotionless, and do
not focus on creating a compelling narrative to oppose ISIS. (Fernandez, 2015,
15) This is a flawed approach since it fails
to understand the psychological profile of
most Western recruits, who are isolated,
emotional and idealistic. They are drawn
to ISIS since they believe it will give them
purpose and meaning, and they are unlikely to trust State Department officials
arguing otherwise.
Governments should use the stories of
ISIS defectors to reach potential recruits.
The stories of defectors will be credible and
relatable, will appeal on an emotional level,
and most importantly will dispel false ideas
about ISIS. 58 defectors, nine of them from
the West, have gone public with their stories. (De Freytas-Tamura, 2015) Almost all

of them left once they became disillusioned
with ISIS. Governments should focus their
messaging on these stories to delegitimize
the utopian image of ISIS with voices that
have experienced the Caliphate first hand.
An alternative communication policy
should focus on personal interventions with
at-risk individuals. If ISIS has established direct contact with someone, they
are unlikely to interact with counter propaganda. The only way to reach them
may be through direct messaging. This
would be modeled in a similar fashion to
the Al-Sakinah program in Saudi Arabia
that matches potential extremists with Islamic experts. Online users that have been
reported as potential targets will be paired
with a counselor who can answer questions
about Islam and discuss the true nature of
ISIS. It should also incorporate e↵orts by
smaller organizations to de-radicalize people over the Internet. For example, the
London think tank Strategic Dialogue ran
experiments “in which it found people at
risk of radicalization on Facebook and tried
to steer them away.” (Talbot, 2015) Although the sample size was small, this individualized approach could have more success than broad, de-personalized messaging
campaigns.
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Helping Those at Risk
Most people who join ISIS from the West
are not making a well-informed decision,
though there will always be a small percentage of hard-liners that truly believe in
what ISIS stands for. They leave isolated
lives in developed societies for a barbaric
state because they are influenced by false
ideas and a misguided sense of purpose.
Based on the stories of defectors, we know
that many are desperate to leave ISIS once
they realize its true nature. (De FreytasTamura, 2015) Community outreach can
eliminate the reasons why most people join

ISIS, namely isolation and a search for
meaning. Once at-risk individuals are identified online, there must be o✏ine e↵orts to
reintegrate them into society. Connecting
them to ISIS defectors and former targets
can provide networks of assistance. Local
leaders, such as imams, and family members can contribute to this process. Existing de-radicalization programs for returning defectors, such as peer-to-peer counseling, should also be extended to these potential recruits.

Conclusion
Governments have been unable to stop the
flow of ISIS recruits from Western countries. Understanding the innovations and
appeal of ISIS propaganda is the first step
to developing a successful counter narrative. Unlike previous extremist groups
like Al-Qaeda, ISIS has exploited social
media and other digital age technology
to e↵ectively spread their message. This
propaganda emphasizes purpose and camaraderie that potential recruits lack at
home. By utilizing social networks and
preying on a lack of identity in recruits,
ISIS has developed an unparalleled messaging operation. Successful responses to
this propaganda should take ISIS accounts
o✏ine, delegitimize the promise of utopia
in the Caliphate, and improve outreach to
at-risk individuals in developed countries.
The policies I suggest raise critical
questions of the ethics of surveillance and
censorship of the Internet. While an in

depth discussion is beyond the scope of
this paper, policy makers should take several ideas into account when debating this
issue. First, such measures should be as
minimally invasive as possible. The right
to privacy should not be unnecessarily violated. The PhotoDNA software I discuss fits this criterion by tagging o↵ending
media without searching personal inboxes.
Similar initiatives should strive to balance
the privacy of citizens with the value of
the knowledge obtained. Second, questions
of censorship should be publically debated
with the goal of reaching a consensus. If we
can establish child pornography guidelines,
a similar set of laws can be reached with regards to extremist propaganda. Stopping
ISIS’s propaganda machine is a crucial priority for Western governments. However, if
these important issues are left unsolved we
risk undermining our fundamental rights in
the process.
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